Recent tremendous development of quantum information theory led to a number of quantum technological projects, e.g., quantum random generators. This development stimulates a new wave of interest in quantum foundations. One of the most intriguing problems of quantum foundations is elaboration of a consistent and commonly accepted interpretation of quantum state. Closely related problem is clarification of the notion of quantum randomness and its interrelation with classical randomness. In this short review we shall discuss basics of classical theory of randomness (which by itself is very complex and characterized by diversity of approaches) and compare it with irreducible quantum randomness. The second part of this review is devoted to the information interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) in the spirit of Zeilinger and Brukner (and QBism of Fuchs et al.) and physics in general (e.g., Wheeler's "it from bit") as well as digital philosophy of Chaitin (with historical coupling to ideas of Leibnitz). Finally, we continue discussion on interrelation of quantum and classical randomness and information interpretation of QM.
Introduction
Recently the interest to quantum foundations was rekindled by the rapid and successful development of quantum information theory. One of the promising quantum information projects which can lead to real technological applications is the project on quantum random generators. Successful realization of this project attracted attention of the quantum community to the old and complicated problem of interrelation of quantum and classical randomness.
In this short review we shall discuss this interrelation: classical randomness.
1 versus irreducible quantum randomness 2 This review can be useful for researchers working in quantum information theory, both as a review on classical randomness and on interpretational problems of QM related to the notion of randomness.
We emphasize the coupling between information and randomness, both in the classical and quantum frameworks. This approach is very natural in the light of modern information revolution in QM and physics in general. Moreover, "digital philosophy" (in the spirit of Chaitin) spreads widely in modern science, i.e., not only in physics, but in, e.g., computer science, artifical intelligence, biology. Therefore it is natural to discuss jointly randomness and information including novel possibilities to operate with quantum information and randomness outside of physics, e.g., in biology (molecular biology, genetics) and cognitive science and general theory of decision making [32] , [1] , [2] .
Random sequences: heuristics
We start by pointing out that one has to distinguish theories of probability and randomness (although they are closely related). At the heuristic level the difference between the notions of probability and randomness can be easily explained. First consider the set Ω of all sequences of the length N composed of zeros and ones, x = (x 1 , ..., x N ), x j = 0, 1. The uniform probability distribution on Ω is defined as p(x) = 1/2 N , x ∈ Ω. Thus all sequences are equally probable. Suppose, for example, that in some experiment we obtained a sequence of the form (spaces are added to make it more readable): 110010010000111111011010101000100010000101101000110000100011010011 0001001100011001100010100010111000000011011100000111001101000100 1010010000001001001110000010001000101001100111110011000111010000 0000100000101110111110101001100011101100010011100110110010001001 This sequence matches well our heuristics about randomness. To use it later, we denote this sequence x rand . (Here N = 258.) Now suppose that we obtained the sequence of the same length of the form x = 010101....01 (composed of blocks 01). It is clear that it cannot be treated as a random sequence.
Would this sequence appear in a random experiment, it would be strange and unexpected. However, the probability to pick up both sequences from Ω is the same. Thus the probability calculus cannot formalize our heuristic image of randomness. Of course, it is clear why the second sequence is not random. The repeatability of the appearance of zeros and onces is a definite signal of presence of some causal process producing this regular pattern. But in general it is very difficult to understand whether there is some causal process behind an observed sequence of zeros and ones. To illustrate this problem, I specially took the "random sequence" x rand as the first 258 digits in the binary expansion of the number π which can be computed algorithmically. Thus one cannot simply proceed heuristically. Some formal theory of randomness and its interrelation with probability has to be developed.
We remark that consideration of infinite sequences cannot solve the problem of mismatching heuristics related to probability and randomness. The space of infinite binary sequences Ω can also be endowed with the uniform probability distribution. Sequences which look like random and sequences which look like regular do have the same probability of appearance (in fact, zero probability).
The problem of interrelation of the notions of probability and randomness was discussed already by Laplace [41] :
"We arrange in our thought, all possible events in various classes; and we regard as extraordinary those classes which include a very small number. In the game of heads and tails, if heads comes up a hundred times in a row, then this appears to us extraordinary, because the almost infinite number of combinations that can arise in a hundred throws are divided in regular sequences, or those in which we observe a rule that is easy to grasp, and in irregular sequences, that are incomparably more numerous."
Roughly speaking, Laplace tried to shift the problem of randomness from individual sequences to classes (sets) of sequences. Although we cannot distinguish random and non-random sequences using probabilities of their individual appearance, we might try to estimate probability measures of some classes of sequences. The set of regular sequences has a small measure; the set of random sequences has an essentially larger measure. From this viewpoint, random sequences are typical and regular are atypical. This viewpoint to formalization of the notion of randomness led to definition of randomness as typicality (Laplace-Ville-Löf, see section 3.2).
Besides the typicality dimension of randomness Laplace also pointed to the aforementioned presence of a causal process as preventing a sequence to be random [41] :
"The regular combinations occur more rarely only because they are less numerous. If we seek a cause whenever we perceive symmetry, it is not that we regard the symmetrical event as less possible than the others, but, since this event ought to be the effect of a regular cause or that of chance, the first of these suppositions, is more probable than the second. On a table, we see letters arranged in this order: C o n s t a n t i n o p l e, and we judge that this arrangement is not the result of chance, not because it is less possible than others, for if this word were not employed in any language we would not suspect it came from any particular cause, but this word being in use among us, it is incomparably more probable that some person has thus arranged the aforesaid letters than this arrangement is due to chance."
This viewpoint led to formalization of the notion of an individual random sequence through formalization of the notion of causal generation of a sequence which culminated in the Kolmogorov algorithmic complexity approach to randomness, sections 4, 4.1.
3 Classical randomness
Approach of von Mises: randomness as unpredictability
Von Mises (1919) theory was the first probability theory [57] - [59] based fundamentally on the principle of the statistical stabilization of frequencies. Although this principle was heuristically used from the very beginning of probabilistic studies, only von Mises tried to formalize it mathematically and to establish it as one of the basic principles of probability theory. His theory is based on the notion of a collective (random sequence). Consider a random experiment S and denote by L = {α 1 , ..., α m } the set of all possible results of this experiment 3 . The set L is said to be the label set, or the set of attributes of the experiment S. We consider only finite sets L. Let us consider N trials for this S and record the results, x j ∈ L. This process generates a finite sample:
A collective is an infinite idealization of this finite sample:
for which the following two von Mises principles are valid. Principle 1 (statistical stabilization). This is the principle of the statistical stabilization of relative frequencies of each attribute α ∈ L of the experiment S in the sequence (2) . Take the frequencies ν N (α; x) = n N (α;x) N where ν N (α; x) is the number of appearance of the attribute α in the first N trials. By the principle of the statistical stabilization the frequency ν N (α; x) approaches a limit as N approaches infinity, for every label α ∈ L. This limit P x (α) = lim N →∞ ν N (α; x) is called the probability of the attribute α of the random experiment S. (Sometimes (when the collective is fixed) this probability will be denoted simply as P (α).)
Principle 2 (randomness). Heuristically it is evident that we cannot consider, for example, the sequence
as the output of a random experiment. However, the principle of the statistical stabilization holds for x and P x (0) = P x (1) = 1/2. To consider sequences (2) as objects of probability theory, we have to put an additional constraint on them: The limits of relative frequencies have to be stable with respect to a place selection (choice of a subsequence) in (2) . In particular, x does not satisfy this principle.
However, this very natural notion (randomness) was the hidden bomb in the foundations of von Mises' theory. The main problem was to define a class of place selections which induces a fruitful theory. The main and very natural restriction which was set by von Mises is that a place selection in (2) cannot be based on the use of attributes of elements. For example, one cannot consider a subsequence of (2) constructed by choosing elements with the fixed label α ∈ L. Von Mises defined a place selection in the following way [58] , p.9:
PS "a subsequence has been derived by a place selection if the decision to retain or reject the nth element of the original sequence depends on the number n and on label values x 1 , ..., x n−1 of the n − 1 preceding elements, and not on the label value of the nth element or any following element".
Thus a place selection can be defined by a set of functions
each function yielding the values 0 (rejecting the nth element) or 1 (retaining the nth element). Since any place selection has to produce from an infinite input sequence also an infinite output sequence, it has also to satisfy the following restriction:
f n (x 1 , ..., x n−1 ) = 1 for infinitely many n.
Here are some examples of place selections:
• choose those x n for which n is prime;
• choose those x n which follow the word 01;
• toss a (different) coin; choose x n if the nth toss yields heads.
The first two selection procedures are law-like, the third selection is random. It is clear that all of these three procedures are place selections: the value of x n is not used in determining whether to choose x n .
The principle of randomness ensures that no strategy using a place selection rule can select a subsequence with different odds (e.g., for gambling) than a sequence that is selected by flipping a fair coin. Hence, the principle can be called the law of excluded gambling strategy. We cite Feller [20] , pp. 198, 199: "The painful experience of many gamblers have taught us the lesson that no system of betting is successful in improving the gambler chances . . .The importance of this statement was first recognized by von Mises, who introduced the impossibility of a successful gambling system as a fundamental axiom." Let x = (x j ) be a collective (random sequence) with the label set L = {0, 1}, i.e., x j = 0, 1. Given a place selection, see (3), (4), let n 1 be the least n such that f n (x 1 , ..., x n−1 ) = 1, n 2 is the next such n, etc. Then by the principle of randomness:
We stress that von Mises did not solve the problem of the existence of collectives. Mises-Church collectives (random sequences). The simplest way (at least from the mathematical viewpoint) is to proceed with special classes of lawlike place selections. In particular, A. Church [16] proposed to consider place selections (3), (4) in which the selection functions f n (x 1 , ..., x n−1 ) are algorithmically computable. (We recall that f n is used to select or not the nth element of a sequence x = (x 1 , ..., x n , ...). It is important to note that the set of all Church-like place selections is countable, see, e.g., [29] . The existence of Church's collectives is a consequence of the general result of A. Wald [62] which we formulate now.
Mises-Wald collectives (random sequences). Let p = (p j = P (α j )) be a probability distribution on the label set L = {α 1 , ..., α m }. Denote the set of all possible sequences with elements from L by the symbol L ∞ . Let φ be a place selection. For x ∈ L ∞ , the symbol φx is used to denote the subsequence of x obtained with the aid of this place selection. Let U be some family of place selections. We set X(U; p) = {x ∈ L ∞ : ∀φ ∈ U lim N →∞ ν n (α j ; φx) = p j , j = 1, ..., m}, where as usual ν N (α; y), α ∈ L, denotes the relative frequency of the appearance of the label α among the first N elements of the sequence y ∈ L ∞ . Theorem 1. (Wald [62] ). For any countable set U of place selections and any probability distribution p on the label set L, the set of sequences X(U; p) has the cardinality of the continuum. By Wald's theorem for any countable set of place selections U the frequency theory of probability can be developed at the mathematical level of rigorousness. R. von Mises was completely satisfied by this situation (see [59] ).
Ville's attack to von Mises theory
However, a new cloud appeared on the sky. This was the famous Ville's objection [60] .
Theorem 2. (Ville). Let L = {0, 1} and let U = {φ n } be a countable set of place selections. Then there exists x ∈ L ∞ such that
• for all N,
Such a sequence x of zeros and ones is a collective with respect to U, x ∈ X(U; 1/2), but seems to be far too regular to be called random. At the same time from the measure-theoretic viewpoint the existence of such sequences is not a problem. The set of such sequences has the Lebesgue measure zero. (We recall that any sequence of zeros and ones can be identified with a real number from the segment [0, 1]). Here we see the difference between the treatment of randomness as unpredictability (a la von Mises) and as typicality (see section 3.2 for the latter -theory of Martin-Löf).
Laplace-Ville-Martin-Löf: randomness as typicality
Ville used Theorem 2 to argue that collectives in the sense of von Mises and Wald do not necessarily satisfy all intuitively required properties of random-ness. J. Ville introduced [60] a new way of characterizing random sequences (cf. with Laplace [41] ), based on the following principle: Ville's Principle: A random sequence should satisfy all properties of probability one.
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Each property is considered as determining a test of randomness. According to Ville [60] , a sequence can be considered random if it passes all possible tests for randomness.
However, this is impossible: we have to choose countably many of those properties (otherwise the intersection of the uncountable family of sets of probability 1 can have probability less than 1 or simply be nonmeasurable; in the latter case the probability is not defined at all). Countable families of properties (tests for randomness) can be selected in various ways. A random sequence passing one countable sequence of tests can be rejected by another. This brings ambiguity in the Ville approach to randomness as typicality (i.e., holding some property with probability one).
It must be underlined that the Ville principle is really completely foreign to von Mises. For von Mises, a collective x ∈ L ∞ induces a probability on the set of labels L, not on the set of all sequences L ∞ . Hence, for von Mises (and other scientists interpreting randomness as unpredictability in an individual sequence), there is no connection between properties of probability one in L ∞ and properties of an individual collective.
Later (in 1970th) P. Martin-Löf (motivated by the talk of A. N. Kolmogorov at the Moscow Probability Seminar) [42] solved the problem of ambiguity of the Ville interpretation of randomness as typicality. He proposed to consider recursive (algorithmic) properties of probability one, i.e., the properties which can be tested with the aid of algorithms. Such an approach induces the fruitful theory of recursive (algorithmic) tests for randomness (see, for example, [43] , [44] ). The key point of this "algorithmic tests" approach to the notion of randomness is that it is possible to prove that there exists the universal algorithmic test. A sequence is considered random if it passes this universal test. Thus the class of typicality-random sequences is well defined. Unfortunately, this universal test of randomness cannot be constructed algorithmically (although by itself it is an algorithmic process). Therefore, although we have the well defined class of Martin-Löf random sequences, we do not know what the universal test for such randomness looks like. Hence, for a concrete sequence of trials we cannot check algorithmically whether it is random or not -although we know that it is possible to perform such algorithmic check.
Kolmogorov: Randomness as Complexity
It is well know that personally A. N. Kolmogorov was not satisfied by his own measure-theoretic approach to probability (private communications of his former students). He sympathized to the von Mises approach to probability in which randomness was no less fundamental than probability. In 1960th he turned again to the foundations of probability and randomness and tried to find foundations of randomness by reducing this notion to the notion of complexity, 1963 [35] - [38] . Thus in short the Kolmogorov approach can be characterized as randomness as complexity. Another basic point of his approach is that complexity of a sequence has to be checked algorithmically.
Let L = {0, 1}. Denote by L * the set of all finite sequences (words) in the alphabet L.
Definition 1 (Kolmogorov). Let A be an arbitrary algorithm. The algorithmic complexity of a word x with respect to A is K A (x) = min l(π), where {π} are the programs which are able to realize the word x with the aid of A.
Here l(π) denotes the length of a program π. This definition depends on the structure of the algorithm A. Later Kolmogorov proved the following fundamental theorem:
5 There exists an algorithm A 0 (optimal algorithm) such that, for any algorithm A, there exists a constant C > 0,
It has to be pointed out that optimal algorithm is not unique. The complexity K(x) of the word x is by definition equal to the complexity K A 0 (x) with respect to one fixed optimal algorithm A 0 .
The original idea of Kolmogorov [35] - [38] was that complexity K(x 1:n ) of the initial segments x 1:n of a random sequence x has to have the asymptotic
i.e., we might not find a short code for x 1:n . However, this heuristically attractive idea was rejected as a consequence of the objection of Martin-Löf [44] . To discuss this objection and connection of the Kolmogorov complexity-randomness with Martin-Löf typicalityrandomness, we proceed with conditional algorithmic complexity K(x; n), instead of complexity K(x). Conditional complexity K(x; n) is defined as the length of the minimal program π which produces the output x on the basis of information that the length of the output x is equal to n.
Theorem 4. (Martin-Löf) For every binary sequence x,
for infinitely many n. Hence, Kolmogorov random sequences, in the sense of the definition (7), do not exist.
Another problem of the Kolmogorov approach to randomness as algorithmic complexity is that we "do not know" any optimal algorithm A 0 , i.e., the Kolmogorov complexity is not algorithmically computable! However, the latter problem can be partially fixed, because there exist algorithmic methods to estimate this complexity (from above and from below).
Kolmogorov-Chaitin Randomness
As we have seen, in its straightforward form the Kolmogorov algorithmic complexity does not lead to a nontrivial notion of a random sequence. However, as it happens [13] , a fruitful theory of individual random sequences is very near, it is enough to slightly modify the notion of Kolmogorov complexity.
First, we remark that the notion of algorithm can be formalized as a partial computable (recursive) function A : L * → L * (here "partial" means that in general such a function is defined only on some subset D = D A of L * ). Thus Kolmogorov complexity of a word x ∈ L * with respect to A equals the length of the shortest word
* is called prefix free if no word in D is a prefix of another member of D. A real world example of a prefix free set (over the alphabet of decimal digits) is the set of country dialing codes in the international telephone system. Definition 2. Let A be an arbitrary algorithm, a partial computable function, with prefix free domain of definition D. Algorithmic prefix free complexity of a word x ∈ L * with respect to A equals to the length of the shortest
Theorem 5. There exists an optimal prefix free algorithm (partial computable function) A 0 such that, for any prefix free algorithm A, there exists a constant C > 0,K
Prefix free complexityK(x) of the word x is (by definition) equal to the complexity K A 0 (x) with respect to one fixed (for all considerations) optimal prefix free algorithm A 0 .
is called KolmogorovChaitin random if it is incompressible (no initial segment of x can be compressed more than for a fixed finite number of bits) or in other words:
Equivalence of Kolmogorov-Chaitin and Martin-Löf approaches to randomness
At the first sight the Kolmogorov-Chaitin and Martin-Löf approaches to randomness differ crucially. The first one is about randomness of an individual sequence. There is no reference to other sequences; one is not interested in how typical is this concrete sequence in an ensemble of all possible sequences. We can say that Kolmogorov-Chaitin randomness is determined intrinsically and Martin-Löf randomness is determined externally. Therefore the following result is really surprising: Coupling between Kolmogorov-Chaitin, Martin-Löf and MisesWald-Church randomnesses Theorem 7. (Invariance of randomness with respect to place selections) Let x = (x j ) be a Kolmogorov-Chaitin (Martin-Löf ) random sequence. Given an algorithmically computable place selection, see (3), (4), let n 1 be the least n such that f n (x 1 , ..., x n−1 ) = 1, n 2 be the next such n, etc. Then x = (x n k ) is also a Kolmogorov-Chaitin (Martin-Löf ) random sequence.
It is also possible to prove that any Kolmogorov-Chaitin (Martin-Löf) random sequence satisfies the principle of statistical stabilization, i.e., relative frequencies tend to limits -probabilities. Finally, we obtain the following important result providing a partial connection with von Mises' notion of collective (with Church's flavor): Corollary 1. Any Kolmogorov-Chaitin (Martin-Löf ) random sequence is also Mises-Wald-Church random.
Of course, the inverse is not correct: as was shown by Ville, there exist Mises-Wald-Church random sequences which do not pass the basic statistical tests.
In the community working on foundations of randomness the assertion that Martin-Löf randomness or equivalently Kolmogorov-Chaitin randomness captures the "true notion of randomness"' conforming to our intuition is sometimes called the Martin-Löf-Chaitin thesis. (The Martin-Löf-Chaitin thesis, like the Church-Turing thesis for the definition of algorithm, is not a mathematical proposition that can be proved or refuted.) Thus in this community the problem of formalization of the intuitive notion of randomness is considered to be solved. Personally I do not think so.
Of course, the realization of the Kolmogorov-Solomonoff-Chaitin program on randomness as complexity-incompressibility was one of the most important contributions to theory of randomness. Now we have a rigorous mathematical theory of individual random sequences. In the same way the Martin-Löf theory of algorithmic statistical tests provides a rigorous mathematical description of randomness as typicality. This theory establishes the solid theoretical foundation for the widely applicable method of testing of (pseudo)random generators, including the NIST test. An output of a (pseudo)random generator has to pass a block of algorithmically designed tests to be "recognized" as a (pseudo)random sequence. Schnorr's proof that the Kolmogorov-Solomonoff-Chaitin and Martin-Löf approaches match perfectly can be considered as culmination of development of theory of randomness in 20th century.
Starting with 1960th (and even earlier with the works of Turing) the evolution of mathematical theory of randomness was closely connected to the computer revolution. Development of the art of programming excited people about the idea of algorithmic computability. In the light of this revolution, it was fashionable to formulate the problem of randomness with the aid of language of computability. However, nowadays when the use of advanced computer programs became the everyday routine and people are not blindfolded by the light of programming anymore, one can ask honestly whether the whole project of the algorithmically based randomness was really so much justified. The dream about creation of computer-like artificial intelligence evaporated. Mind seems not to be driven by computer programs. R. Penrose [48] rightly pointed to the transcendental nature of human mind. In this new context one can try to start a new project of formalization of randomness which is not based on algorithmic computability.
The situation is worse for the approach originated by von Mises (while its importance was recognized already by Laplace) and based on the interpretation of randomness as unpredictability. On one hand, the mathematically rigorous formalization of von Mises notion of collective suffers of Ville's objection. On the other hand, in the Kolmogorov-Solomonoff-Chaitin-Martin-Löf framework one can be only sure that a random sequence is unpredictable in the sense of Mises-Church, but not vice versa. We remark that randomness as unpredictability seems to be the most important for applications. In principle, user is not interested explicitly in complexity of an output of a (pseudo)random generator or whether this output passes a block of algorithmic tests. (We remark that the sequence x rand from section 2 composed of the digits of the number π passes the majority of standard tests of randomness. A special test had to be developed, the so-called π-test, in order to block usage of this sequence.) We are interested only in a possibility to predict the output or, at least, to find some patterns in it. However, as we have seen, the direct formalization of randomnessunpredictability has not yet been created. The von Mises approach (or something totally novel) still waits for its time to come. We remark (private communication of A. Shiryaev) that Kolmogorov died with the hope that in future a new and unexpected approach to the notion of randomness will be elaborated. And, of course, mathematicians will continue to work on this problem. However, it may happen that future attempts will never lead to a mathematically acceptable notion of randomness. This was the final point of my lectures given at IQOQI (Vienna) in May-June 2014. In the aftertalk discussion various opinion were presented; in particular, prof. Zeilinger conjectured that such a painful process of elaboration of the mathematical theory of randomness is simply a consequence of the methodological mistreatment of this notion. It might be that randomness is not mathematical, but a physical notion. Thus one has to elaborate physical procedures guarantying randomness of experimentally produced sequences and not simply try to construct such procedures mathematically. In some sense Zeilinger's proposal is consonant with von Mises' proposal: to find a collective, one simply has to go to a casino. Zeilinger proposes to go to his quantum optics lab at Boltzmanngasse 3.
Irreducible Quantum Randomness from Violation of Causality
In his fundamental monograph [56] von Neumann pointed out that quantum randomness is individual, e.g., even an individual electron is intrinsically random, while classical randomness is related to variation of states in an ensemble, i.e., it is reducible to such ensemble variations. In particular, von Neumann remarked [56] , pp. 301-302, that, for measurement of some quantity R for an ensemble of systems (of any origin),
"it is not surprising that R does not have a sharp value ..., and that a positive dispersion exists. However, two different reasons for this behavior a priori conceivable:
1. The individual systems S 1 , ..., S N of our ensemble can be in different states, so that the ensemble [S 1 , ..., S N ] is defined by their relative frequencies. The fact that we do not obtain sharp values for the physical quantities in this case is caused by our lack of information: we do not know in which state we are measuring, and therefore we cannot predict the results.
2. All individual systems S 1 , ..., S N are in the same state, but the laws of nature are not causal. Then in the cause of the dispersion is not our lack of information, but is nature itself, which has disregarded the principle of sufficient cause."
Thus, for him, quantum randomness is statistical exhibition of violation of causality, violation of the principle of sufficient cause. We now compare this kind of randomness with classical interpretations of randomness, see section ??:
1. unpredictability (von Mises), 2. complexity-incompressibility (Kolmogorov, Solomonoff, Chaitin),
typicality (Martin-Löf).
We start with Kolmogorov algorithmic complexity. One can argue that violation of the principle of sufficient cause has to imply impossibility of nontrivial compression of information in a string of bits produced by measurements of a quantum observable A for an ensemble of systems prepared in the identical state ψ, -that is, impossibility to write a program which would produce this sequence and be essentially shorter than the sequence. Really, it is difficult to imagine how any type of algorithmic process (different from simple output of the result of measurement) can be represented mathematically in the absence of the classical state representation which would encode possible outputs of measurement.
6 However, it is not easy to formalize this kind of reasoning.
Thus if the principle of sufficient cause is really violated for quantum systems and one can really connect its violation to impossibility to shorten representation of the sequence of results of measurement, then the output sequences of quantum measurements must have high Kolmogorov complexity and quantum measurements can be used for creation of random numbers (in the sense of Kolmogorov's complexity approach).
7 This reasoning provides, in fact, the foundational (philosophical) basis for the project on quantum random generators [49] .
In the light of the previous consideration it seems that justification of proper functioning of quantum random generators can be done only from physical principles. Surprisingly mathematics still plays a crucial role, since it is heavily exploited in so-called no-go theorems saying that it is impossible to introduce hidden variables, parameters which provide a finer description of the state of a quantum system than given by its quantum state. Violation of the principle of sufficient cause is incompatible with existence of subquantum models with hidden variables. Roughly speaking, one cannot start selling quantum random generators before a loophole free test rejecting existence of hidden variables is successfully performed.
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Von Neumann understood very well the role of no-go theorems in justification of his thesis about violation of causality by quantum systems and he formulated and presented [56] a sketch of proof of the first no-go theorem, nowadays known as the von Neumann theorem. However, his theorem was criticized, e.g., by Bell [5] , [7] and Ballentine [3] , [4] as based on unphysical assumptions about the rules for coupling an imaginable classical hidden variable model of quantum phenomena and the genuine quantum model. This theorem is considered as having no physical impact. Now the most widely discussed no-go theorem is due to Bell [7] . However, as well as the von Neumann theorem, it is based on concrete rules coupling imaginable classical hidden variable model and the genuine quantum model [30] . Adequateness of these rules to real physical situations also can be criticized [17] , [?] , [29] , [30] , [39] , [40] , [27] , [28] , [18] , [45] , [47] . This is, in fact, the main problem of all no-go theorems [30] as attempts to reject all possibly imaginable models with hidden variables and imaginable rules coupling them with the quantum model. Even Bell pointed out [6] "that 7 We remark that surprisingly nobody tried to estimate Kolmogorov complexity for outputs of quantum measurements, e.g., for Bell's test. We remark that, although the Kolmogorov measure of complexity is incomputable, it can be effectively estimated. Estimation of complexity of outputs of quantum measurements is an exciting project which may clarify a lot in interrelation of classical and quantum randomness.
8 Recently experimenters performed a few tests, e.g., [26] , [25] , [51] which claim to be loophole free. However, it is too early to declare that the problem of loopholes was completely solved. The experimental data should pass independent statistical analysis, cf. [64] , [33] . what is proved, by impossibility proofs, is lack of imagination." (We emphasize that the presented consideration does not question the recent experimental success in performing the final loophole free experiment [26] , [25] , [51] .) Let us assume that Bell's theorem really can be considered as describing physically reasonable coupling between the most general model with hidden variables and QM (as the majority of the quantum community believes). There is still one fundamental problem preventing justification of von Neumann's statement about violation of the principle of sufficient cause. Bell's theorem rejects only local hidden variable models, i.e., models preventing faster than light communications. Thus von Neumann was right and the quantum random generators really produce random sequences (at least in the framework of Kolmogorov's algorithmic complexity) only if nature were not too exotic, i.e., superluminal communications were impossible.
As we know (sectionrandomness), the Kolmogorov and Martin-Löf approaches to randomness lead to the same class of random sequences. Therefore one can proceed formally and say that above reasoning that quantum randomness implies Kolmogorov's randomness also leads to the implication: quantum randomness → Martin-Löf randomness. Thus a sequence produced by a quantum random generator has to pass the universal Martin-Löf test and, in particular, any finite block of algorithmic tests, e.g., the NIST test. Such type of reasoning is very popular in the community working with quantum random generators. It seems that one needs not to check whether the output of a quantum random generator would pass, e.g., the NIST test. There is an objection to such a viewpoint. It is based on recognition that each quantum experiment depends on numerous "technicalities" modifying the output. That is, the actual output may essentially differ from output expected from the theoretical analysis of the experimental design. Thus, in any event, the NIST test is needed to certify a quantum random generator. Now we turn to the notion of randomness as unpredictability, a la von Mises. We repeat that von Mises' principle of randomness can be treated as the law of excluded gambling strategy. However, such a strategy definitely does not exist if the principle of sufficient cause is violated. Hence, under the latter assumption outputs of quantum measurements can be considered as random, from the von Mises viewpoint, i.e., as unpredictable.
We point out that violation of the principle of sufficient cause is state dependent. If the state ψ of a system is one of the eigenstates of the operator A representing a quantum observable, then we can predict the result of measurement with probability one. Thus this principle has to be used with caution.
All previous considerations were devoted to matching of the notion of quantum randomness to the standard notions elaborated in mathematics. As we have seen, by assuming that a sequence is produced by a quantum source of randomness one can be sure that it is random in the classical sense. Thus to be random in the classical sense is a necessary condition of quantum randomness. Is it sufficient? The canonical answer is "no". It is typically claimed that only quantum randomness is genuine randomness.
6 Lawless Universe? Digital Philosophy?
Where did complexity of the Universe come from? This is one of the most fundamental problems of modern science. One of the first scientists who took this problem seriously was Leibniz, see Chaitin [14] for the excellent presentation of Leibniz's views on this problem. 9 And to explain the origin of Universe's complexity Leibniz "simply" appealed to God.
Leibniz was interested in distinguishing lawful and lawless experimental data. He presented a beautiful example illustrating this problem. He proposed us to scatter points at random on a sheet of paper, closing the eyes and stabbing at the paper with a pen many times, say a few hundreds. The output will be a randomly looking pattern on the sheet. However, Leibniz pointed out that even for this data one can easy find a mathematical law, in fact, a polynomial curve, that passes through all these randomly chosen points. To show this he used the concrete application of Lagrangian interpolation procedure.
For reader's convenience, we recall that the Lagrange interpolating polynomial is the polynomial P (x) of degree ≤ (n − 1) that passes through the n points (x 1 , y 1 = f (x 1 )), (x 2 , y 2 = f (x 2 )), ..., (x n , y n = f (x n )), and is given by
Thus, in spite of the fact that the generation of the aforementioned pattern satisfies the heuristic criteria of randomness as unpredictability, we cannot say that the output pattern is lawless. It seems that Leibniz was the first who framed the problem of distinguishing lawfulness and lawlessness correctly: not as distinguishing between lawful and totally lawless processes, but between processes having different degree of complexity. We see that the complexity of the mathematical law (11) rapidly increases with the increase of the size of the pattern. This Leibniz reasoning was the first step towards the modern theory of complexity and randomness. Following Leibniz, we can say that the basic task of a scientist is not just to find mathematical laws describing natural (or mental) phenomena, but the simple laws, laws of low complexity, which at the same time produce sufficiently rich patterns of data (to be of some interest for scientists). Again from the above toy example, one can see that the "majority of mathematical laws" are complex, the appearance of a simple law with rich output is merely an exception. And, for Leibniz, such exceptionally simple and fruitful laws could appear only in accordance with God's plan: "God has chosen that which is the most perfect, that is to say, in which at the same time the hypotheses are as simple as possible, and phenomena are as rich as possible." Here Leibniz was cited again by following Chaitin [14] who used this citation for the following passage:
"The complexity of the Universe is combined from the complexity of laws for expressing of natural phenomena and the complexity of initial and boundary conditions. If initially the Universe was described by simple initial-boundary conditions (as by the Big Bang scenario), then the complexity of the Universe is due to complexity of laws for expression of natural phenomena. Thus the complexity of the Universe can be identified with complexity of its laws and the latter has to be measured as the algorithmic complexity".
However this way of thinking cannot explain where this complexity of laws came from. Although Leibniz's views are very sympathetic for Chaitin, he is not consistent enough to appeal to God. Instead of such an appeal to God's plan of creation of the perfect world, he referred to quantum randomness as generating patterns which cannot be described by simple laws. However, in the purely classical considerations his reference to quantum is really illogical. How can one refer to quantum randomness if the usual classical coin tossing generates a pattern which is algorithmically so complex as a pattern produced by a quantum random generator? We cite book [14] again, p. 119:
"This idea of an infinite series of independent tosses of a fair coin may sound like a simple idea, a toy physical model, but it is a serious challenge, indeed a horrible nightmare, for any attempt to formulate a rational world view! Because each outcome is in fact that is true for no reason, that is true only by accident!"
Chaitin can be really considered as one of the fathers of digital philosophy which, in particular, led to digital physics culminating in Wheeler's statement [63] :
"It from bit. Otherwise put, every 'it' every particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuum itself derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely -even if in some contexts indirectly from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits. 'It from bit' symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom -a very deep bottom, in most instances -an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are informationtheoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe."
In this paper we are mainly interested in quantum theoretical version of informational physics, as Zeilinger-Brukner informational interpretation [65] , [9] - [12] , [66] (see also Kofler and Zeilinger [34] ) and QBism of Fuchs et al. [15] , [?], [22] - [24] . These approaches, while being a part of information physics, do not match the digital philosophy precisely. Here (in QM) information is considered as a primary physical quantity which cannot be defined in terms of other more fundamental variables. Opposite to Chaitin and Wheeler, they (Zeilinger et al. and Fuchs et al.) put the transcendental content in the notion of information which matches perfectly with the transcendental content of a quantum state. For them information need not be produced algorithmically. Opposite to Chaitin, they are not afraid to use real and complex numbers. It seems that complex numbers really represent the physical content of phenomena. (I am not completely sure, but it seems that QM would not work with algorithmically computable complex amplitudes.)
We also mention the information viewpoint on Bohmian mechanics based on the active information interpretation of the quantum potential. This interpretation was elaborated by Bohm and Hiley [8] . It is amazing that even an ontological model of quantum phenomena, Bohmian mechanics, naturally generates the purely information interpretation of its basic entity, the quantum potential. 10 
Unpredictability and Indeterminism
Unpredictability is very often coupled with indeterminism. The latter is the impossibility to describe generation of data by a dynamical map:
where U is a map from the input x 0 to the output x.
In the simplified picture of random processes determinism implies predictability, so no randomness. To be unpredictable a process has to be indeterministic. However, this picture does not match the real situation.
Consider the basic example of a collective, Mises random sequence: an infinite series of independent tosses of a fair coin. It is also random from the viewpoint of Kolmogorov, i.e., in the framework of algorithmic complexity. Hence, it is Martin-Löf random. However, a coin is a classical mechanical system, and its motion is described by Newtonian mechanics, [61] , [19] , [46] , [54] . Hence, one can construct the corresponding dynamical map (12) . Thus if we know the initial condition, we can predict the outcome of a coin toss. The process of generation of this (Mises-Kolmogorov-Martin-Löf) random sequence is totally deterministic. Its unpredictability is just a matter of imprecision in determination of initial conditions. Nowadays this trade between (un)predictability and (im)precision in determination of x 0 can be numerically modeled [54] . The latter paper contains a detailed mechanical model of the coin tossing dynamics. The results of the corresponding numerical simulation were presented graphically. It was shown that if the imprecision in selection of x 0 is less than ǫ, where ǫ depends on parameters of the model (see [54] for details), then one can predict the outcome of each coin toss. However, if one can determine x 0 with accuracy only up to a ball of some radius larger than this ǫ, then the outcome cannot be determined in advance. Thus the story about coin tossing is a story about the precision of determination of initial conditions. Since this is one of the basic examples of the Mises-Kolmogorov-Martin-Löf random sequences, we conclude that the modern mathematical theory of randomness does not contradict determinism in sequence generation. That is why Chaitin [14] has to refer to quantum randomness to emphasize the lawlessness dimension of randomness. To be more precise, we have to speak about the complexity dimension. However, the example of coin tossing shows that there is nothing about complexity of physical laws. The dynamical equations [54] are simple Newtonian equations. At the same time Kolmogorov complexity of the output is very high. What does this mean? Simply that Kolmogorov complexity is not an adequate measure of complexity of physical laws behind generation of sequences of outputs.
What is the main problem in matching the Kolmogorov approach and physics? This is consideration of solely algorithmically representable laws. The algorithmic-computability approach well serves the purposes of computer science and artificial intelligence, but not physics. All basic physical models contain some transcendental element. For example, Newtonian mechanics is based on real numbers. We remind a few measure-theoretic facts about reals.
• Consider the segment [0, 1] and probability p L given by the linear Lebesgue measure; here p L ([a, b]) = b − a. Then probability that a randomly selected number from [0, 1] is rational equals to zero, the same is valid for algebraic numbers (solutions of algebraic equations). Thus probability to get a transcendental number is one.
• One can introduce the notion of a computable real number. Real numbers with probability one are noncomputable.
The classical model of natural phenomena is fundamentally noncomputable. The main problem of digital philosophy and digital physics is that they try to identify the human brain with computer. The latter definitely can operate only with computable quantities, but the former can easily make transcendental steps in reasoning, see R. Penrose [48] for detailed presentation of this viewpoint.
Therefore the following statement of Chaitin, "the manifest of computability", is not about science done by humans, but science done by computers or other artificial intellectual systems, so see [14] , p. 64:
"I think of a scientific theory as a binary computer program for calculating the observations, which are also written in binary. And you have a law of nature if there is compression, if the experimental data is compressed in a computer program that has a smaller number of bits than are in the data that it explains. ...
But if the experimental data cannot be compressed, if the smallest program for calculating it is just as large as it is ..., then the data is lawless, unstructured, patternless, not amenable to scientific study, incompressible. In a word, random, irreducible!" Now we turn to quantum randomness. As was pointed out, the mathematical theory of randomness cannot distinguish "classical and quantum randomness", random sequences generated by coin tossing and by quantum random generators. They are equally algorithmically complex (Kolmogorov) and typical (Martin-Löf).
11 How can one try to formalize the notion of quantum random sequence? Combing the viewpoints of von Neumann and Kolmogorov-Martin-Löf (and Church, Solomonoff, Chaitin, Schnorr), we can say that this is a Kolmogorov-Martin-Löf random sequence such that it is impossible to present a causal model of its generation. (A larger class of quantum randomness one gets by considering a deterministic dynamical system, instead of a general causal model.)
However, it seems to be impossible to prove the impossibility of causal generation for a concrete sequence. In spite of huge activity in generation of various no-go theorems, we still do not have an adequate no-go theorem for one output experiment with quantum systems. The famous Bell theorem is about impossibility of combination of a few causally generated outputs (if we ignore the issue of nonlocality).
12 This theorem cannot exclude the possibility that each of them can be causally generated. It even cannot exclude the possibility of deterministic generation of all these outputs. An adequate no-go theorem might be the original von Neumann theorem [56] , see also section 5. However, nowadays it is commonly considered as inadequate to the real quantum mechanical situation.
Finally, we remark that one has to distinguish quantum randomness and quantum probability. It seems that these notions are often identified (may be unconsciously). Then the nonclassical structure of quantum probability is treated as the argument in favor of nonclassicality of quantum randomness. For example, we can point to intensive studies justifying peculiarities of quantum randomness as compared to classical randomness by using the Bell no-go theorem [49] . Here nonclassical probability structure of the Bell test is treated as leading to generation of nonclassically random sequences.
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